NOT HOLDING THE BALANCE NICE, CLEAR AND TRUE:
THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE by DelPRETE, JOHN M.
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 18
Spring 3-1-1995
NOT HOLDING THE BALANCE NICE,
CLEAR AND TRUE: THE RIGHT TO AN
IMPARTIAL JUDGE
JOHN M. DelPRETE
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
JOHN M. DelPRETE, NOT HOLDING THE BALANCE NICE, CLEAR AND TRUE: THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE, 7
Cap. Def. Dig. 47 (1995).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol7/iss2/18
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2 - Page 47
In clear contrast stand the facts of Weeks. Not only did the same
officer fail to readvise Weeks of his Miranda rights, but the second
interrogation was centered on the very crime that had been the subject of
the first interrogation. Although the Court found otherwise, these facts on
their face appear to violate both the fourth and fifth prongs of the Mosley
test. Yet once again we see not only an unwillingness by the Supreme
Court of Virginia to disturb the findings of the trial courts but also a broad
reading of the Mosley rule in order to preserve the integrity of the
admission.
V. PLEADING GUILTY AND DEFENSE STRATEGIES
Motions to suppress confessions must, of course, be made and
litigated with all the skill at defense counsel's command. Although the
Supreme Court of Virginia has yet to find an inadmissible confession in
a modem capital case, suppression motions may occasionally succeed at
the trial court level and go unreported in appellate decisions. Neverthe-
less, defense strategy should be formulated with knowledge that, in a
capital case, chances of success on suppression motions are slim to none.
This makes it particularly important that a plea of guilty not be entered
in a capital case absent an assurance that the sentence will not be death.
69
In the event of a death sentence, such a decision to plead guilty drops a
number of potentially life-saving eggs from the appellate basket.70 As
has been demonstrated in this article, if the only egg left is review of the
admission of a confession, then the basket in Virginia is virtually empty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of trial judges in the Commonwealth of Virginia
are competent individuals who impartially and diligently perform the
duties of theirjudicial office.1 However, as is true of any large group of
professionals, one will always encounter some who fail to uphold the
standards of their profession. It is those few that this article intends to
address.
The duty to remain impartial is perhaps the most important respon-
sibility of the trial judge. This not only requires that thejudge be impartial
in fact, but that he or she appears unbiased.2 Perhaps because of the
inherently inflammatory nature of many capital murder trials, this
responsibility is sometimes abdicated. Prosecutorial favoritism, which
can range from subtle remarks to outright harassment of defense wit-
nesses, is one manifestation of the problem. For the defense attomey,
combatting such bias is not only difficult but perilous, as most judges do
not appreciate the suggestion that they might be anything less than
neutral. This article provides suggestions for the defense attorney faced
with a biased judge and is intended to serve as an overview of the relevant
state and federal authority addressing the issue of judicial bias and
disqualification.
Part It will examine the federal constitutional right to an impartial
judge, Part III the constitutional and ethical standards for recusal in
Virginia, PartIV the administrative remedy available inVirginia through
the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, and Part V the federal
statutory guidelines governing recusal. Finally, Part VI will discuss the
various strategies and options available to defense counsel faced with a
biased judge.
1 For example, circuit court judges in small, rural Buckingham
County, expressing doubts about the ability of the defendant to receive
a fair trial before the sitting judges, voluntarily requested the Supreme
Court of Virginia appoint an outside trial judge to preside over the
penalty phase of a capital murder trial. The judges stated that they were
"so situated in respect to this case as in their opinion to render it improper
that they should preside. .. ." Commonwealth v. Tate, CR-744 (Cir. Ct.
of Buckingham County Jan. 27, 1995).
2 Nonverbal behavior can pose a serious threat tojudicial impartial-
II. DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO AN
IMPARTIAL JUDGE
A fair trial is a basic requirement of due process, guaranteed by both
the Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution. A fair trial requires that a neutral and detached judge preside over
theproceedings. 3 Just as the defendant's right to ajury trial encompasses
the right to an impartial jury, a defendant has a constitutional right to an
impartial judge. As Justice Black explained:
Fairness ... requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of
cases. [O]ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent
even the probability of unfairness. To this end ... no man is
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.
4
This standard found its origins in Tumey v. Ohio,5 where a unani-
mous Court held that due process of law is violated when the liberty or
property of a defendant is subject "to the judgment of a court, the judge
of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching
a conclusion against him in his case."'6 In Tumey the judge was
compensated by fines generated from convictions. Even though the
evidence clearly showed that the defendant was guilty, this was held not
to preclude his complaint that he was denied due process.7
In Ward v. Village of Monroeville8 the Court reaffirmed Tumey,
stating that
ity. See Note, Judges NonVerbal Behavior in Jury Trials: A Threat to
Judicial Impartiality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1266 (1975).
3 In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), the right to an
impartial judge was one of three rights designated as so basic to a fair trial
that its infringement could never be treated as harmless error.
4 In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
5 273 U.S. 510 (1926).
6 Id. at 523.
7 Id. at 535.
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[Every procedure] which would offer a possible temptation to
the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof
required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not
to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the state and
the accused [denies ... due process of law.]9
Here the petitioner was forced to stand trial for traffic offenses
before a mayor who was responsible for village finances. The mayor's
court, however, provided a substantial portion of the village funds
through fines, forfeitures costs and fees.10 The Court held that this
situation denied Ward a trial before a disinterested and impartial judicial
officer as guaranteed by the due process clause.11
Impartiality may also be lacking and due process violated where the
judge is personally embroiled in the matter, as in a contempt proceeding.
In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 12 a criminal defendant repeatedly insulted
the trial judge during the trial and at the conclusion of the trial was
pronounced guilty of eleven contempt charges and sentenced to eleven
to twenty-two years.13 The United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment of contempt, noting that as the separate outbursts occurred, the
judge "could with propriety, have instantly acted, holding [the defen-
dant] in contempt, or excluding him from the courtroom." 14 However,
when the judge waits until the end of the trial, due process requires that
"another judge, not bearing the sting of these slanderous remarks, and
having the impersonal authority of the law,"15 sit in judgment of the
defendant's conduct.
Similarly, in Taylor v. Hayes16 the Court held that another judge
should have been substituted in order to dispose of contempt charges
against defense counsel where the record showed that "marked personal
feelings were present on both sides" 17 and that marks of "unseemly
conduct [had] left personal stings." 18 Finally, in Johnson v. Missis-
sippi19 the Court stated that a contempt proceeding held at the end of a
trial should have been conducted by another judge because the trial judge
"immediately prior to the adjudication of contempt was a defendant in
one of petitioner's civil rights suits and a losing party at that."20
Counsel should note, however, that involvement in prior proceed-
ings with a defendant, without more, does not rise to the level of a due
process violation unless there is direct bias present. As the Supreme
Court explained in Withrow v. Larkin:
2 1
8 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972).
9 Id. at 60, quoting Tumey at 532. (emphasis added).
10 Id. at 57.
11 Id. at60.
12 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 463.
15 Id. at 466.
16 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
17 Id. at 503.
18 Id.
19 403 U.S. 212 (1971).
20 Id. at 215.
21 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
22 Id. at 56.
23 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
24 Id. at 96.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 98.
27 Id.
28 See Anderson v. Warden, 696 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding
that in a state prosecution for felony murder, the trial judge's conduct in
openly and successfully pressing the defendant's two key alibi witnesses
Judges repeatedly issue arrest warrants on the basis that there
is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the person named in the warrant has committed it.
Judges also preside at preliminary hearings where they must
decide whether the evidence is sufficient to hold a defendant
for trial. Neither of these pretrial involvements has been
thought to raise any constitutional barrier against the judge
presiding over the criminal trial and, if the trial is without a
jury, against making the necessary determination of guilt or
innocence. 22
An important expansion of the due process theme came with Webb
v. Texas,23 a case that addressed prejudicial judicial conduct towards
defense witnesses and how such conduct might deprive a defendant of
due process. Here the Court was faced with a trial judge who gratuitously
singled out the sole defense witness for a lengthy admonition on the
dangers of perjury. Instead of advising the witness of his right to refuse
to testify and of the necessity to tell the truth, the judge implied that he
expected the witness, who had a prior criminal record and was serving a
prison sentence, to lie on the stand.24 The trial court then went on to
assure the witness that if he lied he would be prosecuted and probably
convicted for perjury, and that any sentence for that conviction would be
added to his present sentence, thus impairing his chances for parole.25
The Court held that in this case, such threatening remarks effec-
tively drove the witness off the stand and deprived the defendant of due
process.26 Failure to object by the defendant was not considered a waiver
of the defendant's rights. 27 Unlike the previous due process cases, Webb
did not require that the judge have a direct, substantial pecuniary interest
in the matter before him. Nor did it require that the judge have a personal
interest in the outcome of the case. Instead, the due process violation was
based on the fact that the defendant was denied the right to offer the
testimony of his sole witness.
While Webb on its facts is subject to narrow interpretation because
the witness driven from the stand was the defendant's sole witness, a
broader principle involving prejudicial conduct by ajudge in front of the
jury can be extracted from the case. In Webb the jury had been tempo-
rarily excused and did not view the judge's admonishment of the defense
witness. If the jury witnesses such an outburst by the judge, defense
counsel should argue that such harassmentdiscloses thebias ofthejudge,
invades the province of the jury, and prejudices the accused.
28
to change their testimony interfered with the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to call witnesses in his behalf and to effective assistance of
counsel and his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial); and United
States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 879 (4th Cir. 1970) (exhaustive
questioning of defendant and repeated interruption of defense counsel
during trial and summation held to be reversible as it deprived defendant
a fair trial; it is incumbent on the judge to conduct himself impartially, as
constant or persistent interruption of defense counsel may have the effect
of contaminating the jury's verdict by indicating the judge's evaluation
of the weight of the evidence and the merits of the defense).
29 478 U.S. 570 (1986). See also Concrete Pipe v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993). In Concrete Pipe the
Court was faced with the question of whether the withdrawal liability
provisions of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980
(MPPAA) denied the employer due process. The MPPAA requires that
an employer withdrawing from an multiemployer pension plan pay a
fixed and certain debt to the plan. The MPPAA also requires that
withdrawal liability be assessed by the plan sponsor, and any determina-
tion made by the sponsor is presumed correct. In holding that the
MPPAA did not violate the due process clause and deny Concrete Pipe
an impartial adjudicator, the Court, citing Ward and Tumey, reaffirmed
its belief that due process requires a neutral and detached magistrate and
observed that:
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More recently, the due process rationale was reaffirmed in Rose v.
Clark.29 In Rose the Court's main concern was to reaffirm the "harmless
error" doctrine, first enunciated in Chapman v. California.30 In doing so
the Court reaffirmed its belief that the "harmless error" doctrine does not
apply to certain constitutional errors that necessarily render a trial
fundamentally unfair. The Court cited four examples of errors that could
never be harmless.31 Reasoning that adjudication by a biased judge can
never be harmless as it aborts the basic trial process, the Court made clear
that the state "must provide a trial before an impartial judge. Without
[this] basic protectionl, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function
... and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally
fair."32
I. VIRGINIA'S RECUSAL STANDARD
A. The Due Process Standard in Virginia
Virginia has not adopted an expansive view of the federal constitu-
tional standard. Apparently the Supreme Court of Virginia has not
addressed the issue. However, in Welsh v. Commonwealth33 the Court of
Appeals of Virginia stated that "as a constitutional matter, due process
considerations mandate recusal only where the judge has 'a direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest' in the outcome of a case."
34
The court went on to acknowledge that in some cases bias may be so
pervasive as to offend due process, but "'only in the most extreme of
cases would disqualification on this basis be constitutionally required."
35
The court then stated that"matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy
[and] remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters of
legislative discretion."
'36
The decision in Welsh places a heavy burden on defense counsel to
make a showing of pervasive bias. More importantly however, Welsh
acknowledged that due process grounds for recusal exist if bias, what-
ever its form or source, prejudiced the outcome of the case.
B. Canons of Judicial Conduct for the State of Virginia 37
The Canons of Judicial Conduct for the State of Virginia are the
ethical guidelines usedby both theJudicial Inquiry andReview Commis-
sion38 and the Supreme Court of Virginia to regulate judicial conduct.
The Canons of Judicial Conduct are similar to the Canons of the Virginia
Code of Professional Responsibility in that they are precatory rather than
[Jiustice ... must satisfy the appearance of justice, and this
stringent rule may sometimes bar trial [even] by judges who
have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh
the scales of justice equally between contending parties.
Id. at 2277.
30 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
31 478 U.S. at 576-77.
32 Id. at 577-78.
33 14 Va. App. 300,416 S.E.2d 451 (1992).
34 14 Va. App. 300, 314, 416 S.E.2d 451, 459 (quoting Ward v.
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972)) (emphasis added).
35 416 S.E.2d at459 (citingAiken County v.BSPDiv. ofEnvirotech
Corp., 866 F.2d 661,678 (4th Cir. 1989) (quotingAetnaLifeIns. Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986))).
36 416 S.E.2d at 459 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co., 475 U.S. at 820
(quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523)).
37 The Canons of Judicial Conduct for the State of Virginia became
effective on July 1, 1973, and are based on the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (1972), which has been adopted in whole or in part by forty-
mandatory, using "should" instead of "shall." The permissive nature of
the Canons of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility is
explained in the Preamble: "The Canons are statements of axiomatic
norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct
expected of lawyers... The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Canons..
. are mandatory in character. .. ."39 As adopted in Virginia, the Canons
of Judicial Conduct have no such clarifying statement4 0 but it is not
difficult to conclude that the Canons are intended to be aspirational in
character, rather than mandatory.
In November 1989, the American Bar Association, responding to
criticism of the 1972 Model Code of Judicial Conduct, released the final
draft of a new code ofjudicial conduct. This draft, known as the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct (1990), contained a Preamble which made
clear the intention to impose mandatory, binding obligations upon
judges, "the violation of which can result in disciplinary action." 4 1 The
language of Canons 1-9 was also made obligatory, as "should" was
changed to "shall." Virginia has not adopted these revisions.
Most relevant to the issue of judicial bias is Canon 3, which states
that "A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and
Diligently."42 Canon 3(A)(1) states that "a judge should be faithful to the
law .... He should be unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor,
or fear of criticism."
43
Canon 3 also addresses the issue of disqualification. Canon 3(C)(a)
states, "A judge shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 44 In interpreting Canon
3 the Court of Appeals of Virginia apparently ignored the above-quoted
standard and instead stated that "[i]n Virginia, whether a trial judge
should recuse himself or herself is measured by whether he or she harbors
'such bias or prejudice as would deny the defendant a fair trial." 45 The
determination of this matteris left to the reasonable discretion of the trial
court.46 Clearly this standard is more onerous for defense counsel than
the one set out in Canon 3(C)(a).
The Welsh court proceeded to state that the fact that a trial judge
harbors political views, religious persuasion or values that are in direct
opposition to those of the defendant does not, standing alone, constitute
a basis for recusal:47 "Even when circumstances create an appearance
of bias, unless the conduct of the judge is shown to have affected the
outcome of thecase, the conviction will notbe reversed, even though the
judge may have infringed an ethical duty imposed by the Canons of
Judicial Conduct.
' 48
seven states, the District of Columbia and the Federal Judicial Confer-
ence.
38 See Part IV infra.
39 Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, Preamble, Rules
of S. Ct. of Va., Pt. 6, § II (emphasis added).
40 The Model Code of Judicial Conduct (1972) contains a Preface
that states that "[tihe canons and text establish mandatory standards
unless otherwise indicated." Virginia did not adopt this Preface.
41 Preamble, Model Code of Judicial Conduct (1990).
42 Va. Sup. Ct. R., Pt. 6, § MI, Canon 3.
43 Canon 3(A)(1) (emphasis added).
44 Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Pt. 6, § I, Canon 3C(a)
(emphasis added).
45 Welsh at 459, quoting Justus v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667,
673, 283 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1981).
46 Terrell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 285, 403 S.E.2d 387
(1991).
47 Welsh at 461.
48 Id. (emphasis added).
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The Welsh standard can best be explained as an attempt to limit the
rule announced by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Stamper v. Com-
monwealth.49 In Stamper, the court stated that a judge, in exercising his
or her reasonable discretion in determining whether he or she possesses
such bias or prejudice as would deny a party a fair trial, must not only
consider the true state of his impartiality, but also the public's percep-
tion of his or her fairness, so that public confidence in the integrity of
the judicial system is maintained. 50 This standard effectively tracks the
"might reasonably be questioned" language of Canon 3(C)(a).
In attempting to disqualify ajudge, defense counsel should focus on
the language of Canon 3(C)(a) requiring ajudge to recuse himself when
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The Stamper court's
focus on public perception of the judge's fairness and public confidence
in the integrity of the judicial system should also be stressed. Finally,
counsel should attempt to make a showing that the conduct of the judge
affected the outcome of the case, thereby requiring recusal and reversal
under both the Welsh and federal due process standards.
A related line of Virginia cases address specific prejudicial conduct
by the judge in view of the jury, such that the defendant is denied a fair
and impartial trial. Generally a judge in a trial of a case before a jury
should abstain from expressing by word, deed or otherwise, his personal
views upon the weight or quality of the evidence. Expressions of opinion,
remarks, or comments upon the evidence which have a tendency to
indicate judicial bias, especially in criminal cases, are regarded as
invading the province of the jury and are prejudicial to the accused.
5 1
When such bias has taken the form of aggressive interrogation of the
defendant it has been held to be reversible error.52 Given that juries in
criminal cases give great weight to the words and conduct of the trial
judge, any disclosure of bias by thejudge invades the province of the jury
and prejudices the accused. 53 Similarly, remarks of the court upon
overruling an objection of the defendant that were calculated to leave the
jury under the impression that the court shared the views of the
Commonwealth's attorney have been held to be reversible error.
54
In order to make a compelling showing of prejudicial judicial
conduct under Webb and its Virginia progeny, counsel must obviously
make a record. This may entail voir dire of the judge upon a recusal or
mistrial motion and certainly includes getting rulings and comments on
the record, including in their entirety exchanges in chambers.
IV. JUDICIAL INQUIRY AND REVIEW COMMISSION
Article VI, Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia created the
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (Commission) in 1971. 55
Section 10 directs the General Assembly to create a commission consist-
49 228 Va. 707, 324 S.E. 2d 682 (1985).
50 228 Va. at 714, 324 S.E.2d at 686 (emphasis added).
51 Spear v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 599, 194 S.E.2d 751 (1973).
52 Goode v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 863,234 S.E.2d 239 (1977).
53 Id.
54 McLanev. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 197, 116 S.E.2d 274 (1960).
55 Article VI, § 10, Constitution of Virginia reads: "Disabled and
unfit judges. The General Assembly shall create a Judicial Inquiry and
Review Commission consisting of members of thejudiciary, thebar, and
the public and vested with the power to investigate charges which would
be the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge."
56 Id. (emphasis added).
57 See Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-37.4 (1990): "The Commission is
hereby vested with the power, and it shall be its duty, to investigate
charges arising ... which would be the basis for retirement, censure or
removal of ajudge under § 10 of Article VI of the Constitution ... 
58 Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-37.4 (1990).
ing of members of the judiciary, the bar, and the public "vested with the
power to investigate charges which would be the basis for retirement,
censure, or removal of a judge. ' 5 6 Enacted pursuant to Article VI,
Section 10, Virginia Code sections 2.1-37.1 to -37.18 outline the powers
and duties of the Commission, which are essentially those described in
Article VI, Section 10.
57
A party who wishes to file a complaint of judicial misconduct with
the Commission should do so in a letter explaining the alleged breach of
ethics. The Commission is then required to investigate these charges,5 8
the main purpose being the determination of whether the judge violated
the Canons of Judicial Conduct. At this point, the judge may or may not
be notified of the investigation, and the investigation may or may not
include a formal hearing or informal conference.
59
After an investigation has been concluded the Commission may
either dismiss the charges, call thejudge in for an "informal conference",
or notify the judge that his presence is required at a formal hearing. 60 An
"informal conference" is a meeting between the judge and the Commis-
sion (one or more of its members) to discuss alleged improper conduct.
The purpose of this meeting is to discuss informally the allegations of
misconduct and possible solutions, and the judge may be represented by
counsel. If the matter is not resolved at the informal conference, the
Commission may give the judge notice of a formal proceeding. It should
be noted, however, that granting an informal conference is entirely in the
discretion of the Commission,61 and it may proceed directly to a formal
hearing without first holding an informal conference.
The purpose of the formal hearing is to determine whether a judge
has violated the Canons of Judicial Conduct and, if so, to determine what
sanctions should be imposed. 62 If the Commission finds the charges well
founded and of sufficient gravity to constitute the basis for retirement,
censure or removal, it will then file a complaint against the judge with the
Supreme Court of Virginia, 63 which has the power to retire, censure, or
remove a judge. 64
The Commission may find that the charges, while well-founded, are
not of sufficient gravity to constitute the basis for retirement, censure or
removal. In this case the Commission may summon the judge and advise
him of its findings. The charges will then be removed from the
Commission's docketbutmay stillbe considered with any future charges
against the judge. 65 In the alternative, the Commission may place the
judge on aperiod of supervisory probation, the violation of which will be
grounds foranew charge for failure to cooperate with the Commission.
66
It should also be noted that the Commission can take any of the foregoing
steps after an informal conference with the judge, provided the judge
consents to such actions.
67
59 Rule 2(H), Rules of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commis-
sion.
60 Rules of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.
61 Also significant is the fact that informal conferences are not
governed by the Rules of the Commission.
62 Rule 2(D). At this point in the process, counsel for the
Commission presents the case against the judge, who is represented by
his own counsel.
63 Rule 14(A)(2). See also Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-37.4 (1990);
Article VI, § 10, Constitution of Virginia. Sinceits inception in 1971, the
Commission has seen fit to take such action before the Supreme Court of
Virginia on only six cases. Five cases resulted in censure, and one in
removal.
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V. 28 U.S.C. SECTION 455
With the recent passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994,68 an increase in federal capital trials is
imminent.69 Recusal at the federal level is governed by 28 U.S.C. §
455,70 requiring disqualification of biased or prejudiced judges. 71 Sec-
tion 455 applies to any "justice, judge, or magistrate of the United
States."'72 The standard for disqualification, set out in section 455(a),
requires that the judge disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In addition to this broad
objective standard, section 455 specifies five situations where a judge
must disqualify himself. The first situation, mentioned in subsection
(b)(1), involves personalbias orprejudiceconcerning aparty, orpersonal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts. The other four situations deal
with conflicts of interest arising from previous involvement with the case
in private practice,73 previous involvement with the case through gov-
ernmental employment, financial or other substantial interest in the
outcome of the case,74 and familial relationship to any party, lawyer or
witness to the proceeding.
5
Section 455 was most recently interpreted in Liteky v. United
States,76 where the petitioners were charged with wilfull destruction of
federal property.77 The indictment alleged that they had committed acts
of vandalism at Fort Bening, Georgia, apparently in protest of United
States government involvement in El Salvador. 8 Before their trial in
federal district court the petitioners had moved to disqualify the district
68 Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title VI, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959 (to be
codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 and 21 U.S.C.).
69 See Morgan, The "New and Improved" Federal Death Penalty:
A Brief Guide, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
70 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988), whichwillnotbe discussedinthis article,
allows aparty in adistrict courtproceeding to file an affidavit stating that
the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or
prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party. If the
affidavit is timely and sufficient another judge will be assigned to hear
the case.
71 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988) reads in pertinent part:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following
circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning
a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding;
72 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) (1988).
73 28 U.S.C. § 455 (b)(2) (1988).
74 28 U.S.C. § 455 (b)(3) (1988).
75 28 U.S.C. § 455 (b)(5) (1988).
76 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994). See also U.S. v. Carmichael, 726 F.2d
158, 160 (4th Cir. 1984) (objective standard designed to foster actual
impartiality and appearance of impartiality. The question is whether or
notjudge abusedhis discretion; bias mustbe personal, notjudicial; denial
of recusal is not an abuse of discretion if complaint is merely based on
judge's rulings in instant case or related cases, or attitude derived from
his experience on the bench.).
77 114 S. Ct. at 1147.
78 Id. at 1151.
79 Id. at 1150.
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).79 Their motion relied on events
that had occurred during and immediately after an earlier trial involving
a similar offense before the same district judge.80
Thepetitioners claimed thatrecusal was required in the present case
because the judge had displayed impatience and animosity toward them
and their beliefs.81 The district judge denied their disqualification
motion, stating that matters arising from judicial proceedings were not a
proper basis for recusal.82 The defendants were subsequently convicted
of the offense charged. They appealed, claiming that the district judge
violated 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) in refusing to recuse himself.83 The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the conviction, agreeing with the district court that
"matters arising out of the course ofjudicial proceedings are not a proper
basis for recusal.' ' 84 The United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari85 to settle the question of whether required recusal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a) is subject to the limitation that has come to be known as the
"extrajudicial source" doctrine.
86
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, answered this question
in the affirmative, holding that recusal under section 455(a) is subject to
the "extrajudicial source" doctrine.87 The Court also held that an
"extrajudicial source" is not a necessary condition for recusal, 88 nor is
it a sufficient condition for "bias or prejudice" recusal.89
In explaining his opinion, Justice Scalia asserted that the absence of
the word "personal" in section 455(a) does not preclude the application
of the "extrajudicial source" doctrine,9 0 since the textual basis for the
doctrine is the pejorative connotation of the words "bias or prejudice",
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1151. The alleged hostility toward the co-defendants
included warnings that the trial's purpose was to try a criminal case, not
to conduct a political forum; limiting defense counsel's cross-examina-
tion; questioning witnesses; admonishing witnesses as to the responsive-
ness and materiality of their answers; cautioning defense counsel to
confinehis questions to material issues; admonishing aco-defendant that
closing argument was not a time to make a political speech; handing
down what the co-defendants believed were excessive sentences; and
most importantly, interrupting the closing argument of one of the co-




84 973 F.2d 910 (1992).
85 113 S. CL 2412 (1993).
86 114 S. Ct. 1150. The "extrajudicial source" doctrine was first
enunciated by Justice Douglas in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 583 (1966), where it was stated that "[t]he alleged bias and
prejudice to be disqualifying [under§ 144] must stem from an extrajudicial
source." "Extrajudicial source" was meant to describe a source outside
the judicial proceeding at hand, which would include as extrajudicial
sources earlier judicial proceedings conducted by the same judge.
87 114 S. Ct. at 1150.
88 An extrajudicial source is not the only basis for establishing
disqualifying bias or prejudice. A favorable or unfavorable predisposi-
tion can also be characterized as bias or prejudice, even though it springs
from the facts adduced or the events occurring at trial, if it is so extreme
as to display the trialjudges's clear inability to render fair judgment. This
theory has come to be called the "pervasive bias" exception to the
extrajudicial source doctrine.
89 Id. at 1157.
90 Id. at 1155. It is generally accepted that the extrajudicial source
doctrine applies to § 144 and § 455(b)(1), given that both use the phrase
"personal bias or prejudice."
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which indicates a judicial predisposition that is wrongful or inappropri-
ate. 91 Similarly, because section 455(a) speaks of "partiality", a term
that only refers to such favoritism that is wrongful or inappropriate, its
requirement of recusal whenever a question of a judge's impartiality
exists does not preclude the doctrine's application.
92
VI. PRACTICAL ADVICE
Conditions of potential bias or misconduct before or during a trial
should be addressed by a motion for mistrial or motion for recusal,
sometimes called a motion for disqualification. 93 Errors or conditions
discovered after trial may be raised on appeal. In either case, appellate
courts will require a record of the proceedings in order to gauge whether
thejudgehad an opportunity to correct any errors in response to counsel's
timely objection. Another option is for counsel to voir dire the motion to
recuse. Such a step will not endear counsel to the trial judge, but by this
point the relationship between counsel and the court will probably have
deteriorated enough to permit such a choice to be made without further
harm to the client's cause.
Making the record entails getting rulings and comments on the
record, including exchanges in chambers in their entirety. In a capital
case, nothing should be "off the record."
Motions to disqualify state and local judges should use arguments
based on both the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(C). As previously discussed, the
Canons are essentially similar to 28 U.S.C. § 455. Therefore, it is possible
to argue by analogy and cite federal precedents decided under section 455
9t Id.
92 Id. at 1156.
93 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-153 (1990) states:
When the judge of a circuit court in which a prosecution is
pending is connected with the accused or party injured, or is so
situated in respect to the case as in his opinion to render it
improper that he should preside at the trial, or if he has rejected
that parallel the relevant Canons. Motion for mistrial can also be made
at this point, using both the Canons and federal law to bolster the
argument.
As a last resort, any serious judicial misconduct which violates the
Canons of Judicial Conduct shouldbe reported to the Judicial Inquiry and
Review Commission. While such a complaint may not require reversal,
it sends a message to other judges that such behavior will not be accepted
passively.
When faced with disqualifying a federal judge, counsel can argue
that due process requirements supplement the federal statutory claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 455.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court did not limit the due process right
to an impartial judge to pecuniary situations that mirrored those present
in Ward and Tumey. Rather, the Court expanded the due process rationale
in Mayberry, Taylor and Johnson to include situations where the judge
became personally embroiled in the matter before him. Further expan-
sion came with Webb, where prejudicial conduct towards a defense
witness was held to deny the defendant his due process right to an
impartial judge.
While not adopting an expansive view of this federal constitutional
standard, in Welsh the Virginia Court of Appeals did acknowledge that
in some cases bias, regardless of its form or source, may be so pervasive
as to offend due process. Counsel can then make challenges on both
federal and state grounds.
a plea bargain agreement submitted by both parties and the
parties do not agree that he may hear the case, he shall enter the
fact of record and the clerk of the court shall at once certify this
fact to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and thereupon
another judge shall be appointed ....
See also Bacigal, Virginia Criminal Procedure (2d ed.), § 16-1.
THE "NEW AND IMPROVED" FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY: A BRIEF GUIDE
BY: PETER F. MORGAN
I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent passage of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994,1
Congress dramatically increased the number of federal crimes for which
the Government may seek imposition of capital punishment. The sub-
stantive component of the Death Penalty Act both created new federal
offenses punishable by death and "revived" existing ones that had been
declared unconstitutional or appeared questionable in the wake of
Furman v. Georgia.2 This revival was made possible by the procedural
I The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title VI, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959 (to be codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 21 U.S.C.) (hereinafter
"Federal Death Penalty Act.")
2 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding death penalty as applied in all
jurisdictions unconstitutional).
3 See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). A working familiarity with the
component of the Act, which provides a uniform method of sentencing
for all federal capital offenses that is closely-modeled after the provisions
of the so-called "Federal Drug Kingpin Statute."
3
The above developments suggest at least the theoretical possibility
that the number of federal capital cases requiring appointed or retained
defense counsel in the Commonwealth will increase in the near future.
4
Accordingly, the following analysis of the current state of federal death
penalty law should prove helpful.
provisions of this earlier statute is assumed here. For a more in-depth
discussion, see O'Grady, WhatEvery Virginia CapitalDefense Attorney
Should Know About the Federal Drug Kingpin Statute, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 6., No. 1, p. 4 0 (1993).
4 The actual impact of the statute on Virginia capital defense
practice may be minimal, as discussed infra in Part V-B.
